What has the United States and Israel achieved in Iran?

Monday night, the president forty-eight hours Donald Trump He ordered a series of strikes at Iran’s nuclear site, announcing a ceasefire between Israel and Iran. Earlier that day, Iran launched missiles at a U.S. air base in Qatar, with an early warning and no casualties. The Trump administration initially expressed reluctance to formally participate in Israel’s campaign to destroy Iran’s nuclear program, but, Saturday’s strikeTrump is openly addicted to the possibility of regime change. Even after he announced on Monday that he helped his agent suspend hostilities, Iran and Israel continued to exchange missile attacks, both accusing each other of breaking the ceasefire clause. “We basically have two countries that have been fighting for so long that they don’t know what they’re doing,” Trump told White House reporters Tuesday morning.

Nicole Grajewski is an associate researcher in Carnegie’s International Peace Nuclear Policy Program and the author of the book “Russia and Iran. ” (Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi criticized the U.S. strike in Moscow with his country’s strongest ally, Vladimir Putin. Relations with Iran and Israel could be a harbinger of the region, and why a war to end Iran’s nuclear program could bring long-term uncertainty.

What are your concerns about a short-term, medium-term and long-term ceasefire?

In the short term, I think my main focus is accidental escalation. Whether it was Iraq’s Iranian proxy group that launched some responses to Israel and Israel, or because of a response to Israel or Iran’s statements. My focus has been linked to the difficult relationship between Iran and Israel in the medium and long term, which may continue. This ceasefire will not eliminate the shadow war between Iran and Israel that is locked in. And the nuclear issue continues to be imminent.

how so?

On Monday, the Iranian parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Committee approved an overview of a bill that would suspend Iran’s rule with the International Atomic Energy Agency. This would cut stocks that determine Iran’s highly abundant uranium and access to these nuclear sites, or at least take into account Iran’s stock. Therefore, there may be momentum within Iran to monitor its nuclear program internationally.

Netanyahu has also been very aggressive lately – you might see him winning a short-term ceasefire like he did with Gaza and then want to start the war again?

It is very predictable that Israel has another chance to enter and eliminate certain facilities or leadership. I think that many of the dynamics of escalation may depend on the remaining content of Iran’s nuclear program and the distance they are going to re-establish. Some uranium metal facilities have been destroyed, so for some weaponization efforts, this is actually a good freeze. But we don’t know where Iran’s highly abundant uranium is. Then Iran has a lot of components of centrifuges that have not been inspected by IAEA since 2021. So on the long run, you’ll see Iran making a secret plan. Furthermore, since you do see Israel assassinating Iranian scientists in the past, Iran has created a very powerful community of nuclear scientists, nuclear engineers, nuclear physicists in order to maintain the continuity of knowledge. Therefore, this is not to eliminate knowledge either. And I think that because the penetration of large-scale intelligence does weaken Iran’s military response and lead to the destruction of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard (IRGC) leadership, one thing that will happen is that there will be a higher state of protection on the social level, a higher state of protection, and I think, a higher state of social measures.

What internal and external dynamics do you see in Iran now?

Iranian leaders want to convey to them the expression of stability and power appearance. But it is also about sending a signal to the United States that Iran is not vulnerable and that despite these huge hits in their military facilities, they still reserve the right to respond in terms of their traditional power. But it appears that warnings or signals were sent to the United States and/or Qatar before this Qatar military attack. Iran may not want to participate in the war of attrition with the United States, even if they are preparing for a loss.

So the signal is just to make it clear that extending the war is not what Iran wants?

Yes, obviously, there is this concern about regime change and internal stability. So I think that will be something Iranian strategists are thinking about, because in the kind of control they have in their homes, the continuation of this war also increases their vulnerability. Israel targeted some of the repressive organs inside Iran on Monday, such as the so-called Basij troops and other parts of internal security services.

Can you talk about the structure and how the regime works?

The regime plays a role in repression and terror. This is how it formed in this revolutionary context and after the Iran-Iraq War. But this is serious bureaucracy and institutionalized. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard is one aspect of this. Part of it is Basij, which is their internal force clip. But they also have major economic interest groups that are indeed based on corruption. It is factional. In some factions, you have clergy and emphasize certain parts of the country. So, for example, in QOM, it is quite a lot of power when it comes to clergy. So you will see in discussions on the Oversight Council that oversees elections and approves legislation and even serial speeches. But there are these tough fronts, which are very entrenched in the ideological confrontation with the United States and Israel. This also includes a strong emphasis on maintaining at least this threshold nuclear status and projecting its power throughout the region.

Therefore, Iran plays a mean role to some extent, but it is also an ideological one. And, of course, this is all driven by a keen sense of vulnerability to any internal or external unrest that may threaten the regime’s existence. Of course, there is also a supreme leader who is the final arbitrator within Iran, but there is a typical arbitrator around.

I have seen you warn of the consequences of regime change. How does the structure of the system you just defined make you pay specific attention?

One problem with discussing the changes in the Iranian regime is that this is its own goal, but nothing happened afterwards. The Iraqi experience is a good example. But with Iran, I think it is worrying that the existence of such a strong military faction may give some anti-cooperation to some extent. The Iranian people do not support the current regime primarily, and many Iranian people do not support revolutionary theocratic politics. However, there are also some who are actually responsible for such large-scale suppression agencies. So one of my concerns is that we follow regime change policies, and what actually happens in Iran is so repressive and insecurity that civilians are the ones suffering the most. The change in regime ultimately depends on the Iranian people. One hopes that this regime will indeed come at some point and the rise of some democratic governments. But, you know, that’s not always how international relations work.