Dangerous consequences of Donald Trump’s strike in Iran

Saturday, President Donald Trump Bring the United States into Israel’s war against Iran. American aircraft and submarines Hit three locations In Iran, two nuclear enrichment facilities, including Natanz and Fordo- and a complex core facility near Isfahan, are believed to contain uranium storage. The Israeli government has been pushing for Trump’s strike, in part because it is believed that it will only be possible to arrive with U.S. planes and weapons. Before Israeli attack on IranStarting a few hours a week ago, Trump has repeatedly stated that he wants to reach a nuclear deal with Iran, although in his first term, he pulled the United States out of Barack Obama’s nuclear deal with the country.

In a televised speech on Saturday night, Trump claimed that the three sites were “completely and completely eliminated” and said Iran must now “realize peace”, warning that if there is no attack, it must be warned. It is not clear how much damage is, nor whether and how Iran retaliates. (Trump announced Thursday whether a strike decision would be made “within two weeks” and negotiations are still possible.)

Late Saturday, I spoke with James M. Acton, chairman and co-director of the Carnegie International Peace Foundation’s nuclear policy program over the phone. In our conversation, length and clarity have been edited, we discuss why even a successful strike could cause less damage to Iran’s nuclear program than the Trump administration hopes, whether this action can lead to a greater conflict with Iran and why Trump’s decision to withdraw from the Obama nuclear deal gives the best chance to cut Iran’s nuclear deal.

What is your impression of what happened tonight?

Honestly, as a U.S. citizen, I am shocked – the president will start military operations without the authorization of Congress. That was my direct reaction. But as a nuclear policy analyst, I am very worried that this is the beginning of a long conflict, not the end of a conflict.

why is that?

In many reports I have seen, among many of the advocacy for what President Trump does tonight, it is the impression that it will be one thing – the president will authorize the strike, Faudo will be destroyed, and the Iran nuclear program will end, which will be a very fast, completely decisive, and it will be a very challenging, completely decisive military intervention. I think this is wrong for two reasons. The first is to immediately engage in Iran’s revenge. Iran has many short-range ballistic missiles that can reach U.S. bases and U.S. assets in the region. Israel is not specifically targeting the infrastructure. It is mainly focused on long-term Iranian missiles that can reach Israel. So I hope to see some very dramatic revenge in Iran, which I think puts a lot of pressure on the president. This is the first way to upgrade immediately in the short term.

In a slightly longer period of time, I believe Iran will likely rebuild its nuclear program. I think Iran may withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and thus kick the inspectors out. The NPT bans non-nuclear-weapon countries such as Iran from purchasing nuclear weapons and requires them to accept International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, such as inspections, to verify this commitment. This puts us in a position where the president of the United States or Israel may attack Iran again and again.

I don’t want to speculate how successful these strikes are, but if the strikes do what Trump advocates, how much blow will it have to Iran’s nuclear program?

My answer may be a slightly satisfying one, but it depends on the others being broken. There are two things that worry me. The problem is not just destroying fixed locations. Iran also has a bunch of highly abundant uranium that was once thought to be stored in a tunnel below Isfahan. The Iranians claim they have cancelled the material. Then, secondly, when the Joint Integrated Action Plan (JCPOA) is being monitored, the building centrifuge components being monitored are now no longer under monitoring.

The JCPOA is a 2015 nuclear deal negotiated by the Obama administration, which exchanges sanctions against Iran to reduce nuclear inspections and limit enrichment and withdraw in 2018.

Exactly. If the highly enriched uranium and centrifuge components are small, it means they are portable. They can move around the country; they can be hidden. So if all the US does is destroy the big websites we know are rich facilities, but without destroying highly enriched uranium and centrifuge components, I think Iran may be rebuilt relatively quickly and maybe rebuilding in a year or two. It’s hard to spend the exact time here. If the operation manages to destroy some highly enriched uranium, or all highly enriched uranium and centrifuge components, the reconstruction timeline may be longer. I would like to point out that in any case the reconstruction timeline will be much shorter than the ten to fifteen years of JCPOA, which is how long the deal should last. It is also worth pointing out that people think of JCPOA as a bad deal because The only one It lasted for so long. Even if that’s a little misleading.

Why?

Since some parts of the JCPOA lasted for twenty years and some lasted for twenty-five years, it was actually uncertain. This is actually a very complex arrangement, and over time, the JCPOA is phased out. The limitations on enrichment and uranium storage sizes lasted ten to fifteen years. The IAEA rights to monitor centrifuge components lasted for twenty years. There is no time limit for prohibiting weaponized activities. But even in the time of frequent citations of ten to fifteen years, we are now likely to deal with the reconstruction schedule in any case that is much shorter.

One central point I have seen in the past is that this strike and the alternative to Israeli action is not nothing, but a deal Trump has made in 2018. Is this a success?

I think JCPOA is working well. The U.S. intelligence community assessed Iran’s compliance with the deal. Iran’s plans are strictly restricted and have been strictly inspected. It seems to me that when Trump exited, it works well. I do think there was a slim but real diplomatic opportunity in the past few days. Obviously, it is not possible to rebuild JCPOA, but you have an interesting situation where Israel starts attacking. It cannot destroy everything in Iran, including but not limited to Fordo, and the U.S. threat has brought some leverage to Trump. Trump sometimes seems interested in trying to use this leverage to negotiate. I do feel like there is some kind of diplomatic window there. I was sad because that window was never taken away and there was no good intention to try to exploit it.

Is it true that Trump or Iranians lacking sincerity?

We don’t know. But I want to point out that serious negotiations cannot be conducted within 48 hours since Trump announced that he would give diplomatic opportunities. He said this week that he will make a decision in it Two weeks. So my feeling is that the United States has never really tried to follow up on this and actually tried to negotiate some kind of diplomatic reconciliation here.